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Towards a Phenomenology of Rupture

Michal Lipták

Filozofia October 14, 2025 DOI: 10.31577/filozofia.2025.80.5.6 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that limit phenomena threaten Husserl's transcendentalist phenomenology because it seeks apodictic and necessary structures while focusing on normal, optimal, and typical phenomena. Proposes "rupture" as the concept best expressing the limit-character of such phenomena, contending that rupture in the normal course of experience calls for re-configuration that introduces novelty, and that a systematic phenomenology of rupture may help phenomenology address the problem of novelty.

Abstract

What makes phenomena such as birth, death, creation or fate specifically “limit phenomena” within Husserl’s phenomenology is not simply their difficulty, but also that they seem to threaten phenomenology as a transcendentalist project. As a transcendentalist project, phenomenology tries to overcome contingency by seeking the apodictic and necessary, leading Husserl to focus on normal, optimal, typical phenomena. It is at the margins that phenomenology is threatened by collapsing back into contingency. In my paper, I propose the concept of “rupture” as that which best expresses the limit-character of limit phenomena. The rupture in the normal course of experience calls for re-configuration that introduces novelty. I suggest that a systematic investigation into phenomenology of rupture may help phenomenology to address the problem of novelty.

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