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Cognitive Science, Phenomenology, and the Unity of Science

Jesse Lopes

Studia Phaenomenologica 2024 DOI: 10.5840/studphaen2024245 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that phenomenology, not associationist psychology, can unify the sciences by revealing irreducibly syntactic phenomena, and proposes the language of thought (LOT) as the necessary mechanism underlying these phenomena, framed through Husserl's contrast between Galilean science and the life-world.

Abstract

Hume once argued the basic science to be not physics but “the science of man” and the foundation of this science to be the empiricist mechanism of association governed by the law of similarity in appearance—now more popular than ever in the form of artificial neural networks. I update Hume’s picture by showing phenomenology to be centrally concerned with providing a unifying basis for all the sciences (including physics) by going beyond the psychology of associationism (passive synthesis) to reveal phenomena that are irreducibly syntactic (not associative) in structure. I therefore argue that the language of thought (LOT) is the necessary mechanism at the basis of these descriptive phenomena. I conclude by sketching a new picture of all the sciences unified by LOT based on Husserl’s opposition to Galilean “physicomathematical” science vis-à-vis the life-world (Lebenswelt).

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