This paper reinterprets the notion of the minimal self, usually identified with the core and experiential self, within phenomenological psychiatry. It criticises the thesis asserting the immutability of the minimal self, positing that this dimension comprises two distinct levels: a more formal, immutable level and a more robust level susceptible to change. In the first section, I show how...
In the introduction to The Second Sex (1949), Simone de Beauvoir sketches a severe moralist view on the feminine existence by considering the woman’s consent to becoming other than the authentic phenomenological subject a moral fault. We may ask what happens within this view to altered existential modes that could elicit from the woman’s situation of oppression in patriarchal societies, as it...
Hume once argued the basic science to be not physics but “the science of man” and the foundation of this science to be the empiricist mechanism of association governed by the law of similarity in appearance—now more popular than ever in the form of artificial neural networks. I update Hume’s picture by showing phenomenology to be centrally concerned with providing a unifying basis for all the...