If a fish can pass the mark test, what are the implications for consciousness and self-awareness testing in animals?
M. Kohda, Takashi Hotta, Tomohiro Takeyama, S. Awata, Hirokazu Tanaka, Jun-ya Asai, Alex Jordan
PLoS Biology February 1, 2019 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.3000021 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA fish, the cleaner wrasse, shows behaviors that may be interpreted as passing the mark test for mirror self-recognition, a cognitive ability previously known only in mammals and birds. When given a colored tag, the fish scrapes their body in front of a mirror to remove it but does not respond to transparent marks or to colored marks without a mirror. The finding challenges whether these behaviors indicate self-awareness in fish or reflect a different cognitive process, raising questions about the mark test's validity across species.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Experimental study Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Population | Cleaner wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus) |
| Intervention | transparent mark |
| Keywords | Medicine Biology |
| Key finding | Cleaner wrasse exhibit behaviors consistent with passing the mark test for mirror self-recognition, including contingency testing and self-directed mark removal. |
Abstract
The ability to perceive and recognise a reflected mirror image as self (mirror self-recognition, MSR) is considered a hallmark of cognition across species. Although MSR has been reported in mammals and birds, it is not known to occur in any other major taxon. Potentially limiting our ability to test for MSR in other taxa is that the established assay, the mark test, requires that animals display contingency testing and self-directed behaviour. These behaviours may be difficult for humans to interpret in taxonomically divergent animals, especially those that lack the dexterity (or limbs) required to touch a mark. Here, we show that a fish, the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus, shows behaviour that may reasonably be interpreted as passing through all phases of the mark test: (i) social reactions towards the reflection, (ii) repeated idiosyncratic behaviours towards the mirror, and (iii) frequent observation of their reflection. When subsequently provided with a coloured tag in a modified mark test, fish attempt to remove the mark by scraping their body in the presence of a mirror but show no response towards transparent marks or to coloured marks in the absence of a mirror. This remarkable finding presents a challenge to our interpretation of the mark test—do we accept that these behavioural responses, which are taken as evidence of self-recognition in other species during the mark test, lead to the conclusion that fish are self-aware? Or do we rather decide that these behavioural patterns have a basis in a cognitive process other than self-recognition and that fish do not pass the mark test? If the former, what does this mean for our understanding of animal intelligence? If the latter, what does this mean for our application and interpretation of the mark test as a metric for animal cognitive abilities? Editor’s note This Short Report received both positive and negative reviews by experts. The Academic Editor has written an accompanying Primer that we are publishing alongside this article (https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3000112). The linked Primer presents a complementary expert perspective; it discusses how the current study should be interpreted in the context of evidence for and against self-awareness in a wide range of animals.