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Phenomenology of Perception: Things, Hi/stories, Ideas

Daniele Nuccilli

Contributions to Phenomenology 2026 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-30065-2_5 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that, in Schapp's account, perception is synaesthetic and exceeds immediate presentation: sensible features disclose a thing's inner constitution and materiality, and things appear together with their destiny and past events, so the outlines of their hi/story take shape within perception itself.

Abstract

Abstract In the Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung , Wilhelm Schapp develops a phenomenology of perception centered on how the world manifests itself to the senses. Building on and extending Husserl’s account, the analysis shows how the thing of everyday experience appears as a unified object whose “character of reality” emerges through the interplay of the senses. This expansion concerns both the intuitive fullness of presentation and the synaesthetic breadth of perception, through which sensible features such as color, sound, and tactility disclose not only appearance but also the inner constitution and materiality of the thing. Perception thus unfolds within structures that exceed immediate presentation, bringing into view the individuality of what is given and, with it, the emergence of the individual idea. At the same time, things present themselves together with their destiny and the series of events they have undergone, so that the outlines of their hi/story begin to take shape within perception itself.

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