Assessing the Plausibility of a Buddhist Physicalism
Buddhist Physicalism? August 5, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/9780197799697.003.0009 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism |
| Key points | The chapter addresses four objections to naturalizing Buddhism via physicalism: that physicalism undermines karma-rebirth, conflicts with meditation as objective inner observation, strips the world of meaning and value, and is rendered unnecessary by Mādhyamika anti-realism. It explores possible Buddhist physicalist responses to each. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter addresses concerns that have been raised concerning any project that seeks to “naturalize” Buddhism. One major concern is that the embrace of physicalism would render the karma-rebirth ideology highly implausible. Another concern is that physicalism’s illusionism would seem to be incompatible with the central role of meditation in Buddhist practice, given the common understanding of meditation as a technique that facilitates the objective observation of inner mental states. Then there is the complaint that physicalism strips the world of all meaning and value. Finally, a Mādhyamika would object that their global anti-realism has already established that consciousness can be no more than a useful fiction, so that a metaphysical realism like Buddhist physicalism is neither necessary nor philosophically defensible. The chapter explores how a Buddhist physicalist might respond to all these concerns.