Questioning the Grounds for Buddhist Physicalism

Abstract

The Buddha puts forward a dualist metaphysics in the early Buddhist discourses (Nikayās). The first centuries after the Buddha’s death led to the emergence of multiple schools and traditions that attempted to organize, interpret and systematize the Buddha’s teachings. Though the philosophers in these traditions regarded the Nikayās as authoritative, that did not deter them from interpreting the Buddha’s teachings in ways that were conducive to their theoretical and practical concerns. For example, the Abhidharma philosophers reduced the five psychophysical aggregates (skandhas) into constituent, discrete psychophysical events (dharmas) and reinterpreted impermanence as momentariness. The Yogācāra school rejected the psychophysical dualism of the Nikayās in favour of consciousness-only idealism. It is in this spirit that Siderits (2025: 5) raises a closely related question: might there be room in the Buddhist tradition for a newly developed physicalism? Siderits presents considerations to suggest that a Buddhist physicalism is possible and indeed plausible. Siderits’ book is a masterful consideration of a live issue in contemporary philosophy: the place of consciousness in a physicalist world. We applaud the spirit of the book and Siderits’ motivation to consider Buddhist physicalism as a live option in contemporary philosophy, a contender for having the correct metaphysical view of phenomenal consciousness. In this critical notice, we will, of course, take a critical perspective on Siderits’ important book. Buddhist Physicalism? is wide-ranging; we will focus on one important set of themes regarding the ontology of composites and the invocation of persons.