Existential and Cognitive Psychology Contrasting Views of Consciousness
Brent D. Slife, Suzanne Barnard
Journal of Humanistic Psychology July 1, 1988 DOI: 10.1177/0022167888283008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that cognitive psychology's cybernetic feedback principles cannot explain self-awareness, volition, and futurity, which existentialists consider fundamental to consciousness. The authors attribute this inadequacy to cognitive psychology's exclusive reliance on demonstrative reasoning, contrasting it with existential psychology's emphasis on dialectical reasoning. |
Abstract
Cognitive psychology is considered by some theorists to have subsumed "third force" views of consciousness. The purpose of the present article is to show that the cybernetic conceptions of cognitive psychology do not explain the qualities of consciousness considered fundamental to existentialists. It is our contention that feedback principles are inadequate to explain self-awareness, volition, and futurity. The core of this inadequacy lies in cognitive psychology's assumption about human reasoning. Cognitive psychologists are shown to rely exclusively upon demonstrative reasoning, whereas existential psychologists are shown to emphasize dialectical reasoning.