The limits of neurophysiological models of consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00040681 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Gray's neurophysiological model, like all third-person perspective models, can address how consciousness arises from the brain but not how it evolved, affects behaviour, or confers survival value; proposes that answering such questions requires taking the first-person nature of consciousness seriously alongside third-person brain models. |
Abstract
AbstractThis commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other thirdperson perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.
Citations in the library
Cited by 3
- Consciousness and the “causal paradox” Behavioral and Brain Sciences September 1, 1996
- The place of consciousness in the information processing approach: The mental-pool thought experiment Behavioral and Brain Sciences September 1, 1996
- Consciousness during dreams. Consciousness and Cognition March 1, 2001
Cites 12
- Consciousness in Contemporary Science Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992
- The Disorder of Consciousness in Schizophrenia Schizophrenia Bulletin 1987
- Advances in Consciousness Research Advances in Consciousness Research December 16, 2013
- Consciousness, dreams and virtual realities Philosophical Psychology 1995
- Consciousness and Brain Archives of General Psychiatry August 1, 1973
and 7 more in the library