Attention: the mechanisms of consciousness.
M I Posner
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences August 2, 1994 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.91.16.7398 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key findings | Argues that brain-imaging findings on attentional networks—orienting to sensory stimuli, activating ideas from memory, and maintaining the alert state—provide a useful empirical background for distinguishing conscious from unconscious information processing, and relates these findings to classical attention research and anatomical and physical theories of consciousness. |
Abstract
A number of recent papers and books discuss theoretical efforts toward a scientific understanding of consciousness. Progress in imaging networks of brain areas active when people perform simple tasks may provide a useful empirical background for distinguishing conscious and unconscious information processing. Attentional networks include those involved in orienting to sensory stimuli, activating ideas from memory, and maintaining the alert state. This paper reviews recent findings in relation to classical issues in the study of attention and anatomical and physical theories of the nature of consciousness.
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