Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology
Naomi Eilan, Johannes Roessler
Agency and Self-Awareness August 27, 1992 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199245611.003.0001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Libet's experiments suggest awareness of intentions follows brain activation, threatening the idea that conscious intentions control actions. |
Abstract
Abstract In the mid-1980s Libet conducted a series of experiments which, he argued, showed that we are aware of intentions to act only after the brain area responsible for initiating acting has already been activated. He, and others, took these experiments to show that our brain ‘decides’ on courses of action independently of our consciousness, where this in turn threatens the idea of free will, the idea that our actions are controlled by our conscious intentions. For immediate purposes the main point to note here is the intuitive connection highlighted by the debate surrounding Libet’s claims, between the kind of control we think we have of our actions, on the one hand, and our awareness of our intentions and actions, on the other. For the suggestion underpinning Libet’s claims is that unless the initiation of the action is something we are aware of, the action itself is not under the kind of control we think we have as agents, the kind of control in virtue of which we speak of freedom of the will.