Consciousness, Continuity and Responsibility: Toward a Stratified Relational Model of Human–Animal Difference
Philosophies March 19, 2026 DOI: 10.3390/philosophies11020044 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Narrative review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key findings | Argues that the shift from mechanistic to embodied and affective accounts of animal consciousness undermines traditional human exceptionalism, and proposes a Stratified Relational Responsibility Model (SRRM) that grounds moral considerability in shared evolutionary conditions while treating humans' reflexive and institutional capacities as intensifying, rather than elevating, their ethical obligations within multispecies ecological systems. |
Abstract
The intricate relationships between humans and animals have long shaped philosophical, cultural and scientific inquiry. This narrative review examines evolving conceptions of animal consciousness, agency and sentience within broader historical, ethical and epistemological contexts. Drawing on philosophy, ethology, neuroscience, psychology and animal studies, it critically engages debates on anthropocentrism, cognitive ethology, moral considerability and relational ontology. By tracing the shift from mechanistic models of animality to embodied and affective accounts of consciousness, the analysis highlights how contemporary scholarship destabilises traditional forms of human exceptionalism. Building on this interdisciplinary synthesis, the article advances a symbiotic humanist orientation that integrates evolutionary continuity with multidimensional models of consciousness and differentiated normative responsibility. The argument culminates in the articulation of a Stratified Relational Responsibility Model (SRRM), which reconciles ontological continuity with asymmetrical accountability. Within this framework, shared evolutionary conditions ground moral considerability, while the emergence of reflexive and institutional normativity intensifies human ethical obligation. The model offers a non-anthropocentric yet normatively robust account of human–animal relations, situating human distinctiveness not in metaphysical superiority but in heightened responsibility within multispecies ecological systems.