What is it like to be a blob? A distributed, decentred and context-sensitive neurobiology of consciousness
Jeremy I Skipper, Christopher Timmermann, Rosalind McAlpine, Krisztina Jedlovszky, Magdalena Jaglinska, Greg Cooper, George Blackburne
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Meta-analysis |
|---|---|
| Population | Consciousness-focused neuroimaging studies |
| Key findings | The analysis found no invariant cross-domain core of brain regions for consciousness. Distributed functional maps, especially organismic-affective ones, predicted the residual consciousness landscape better than spatial surrogates, but contributions varied by context. The authors argue against an invariant core, supporting a distributed neurobiology of consciousness. |
Abstract
Consciousness is often studied by asking whether particular brain regions or systems are privileged. We tested a distributed, decentred and context-sensitive alternative using 579 consciousness-focused neuroimaging studies. Semantic clustering of titles and abstracts identified seven domains whose corrected meta-analytic maps showed limited overlap and no invariant cross-domain core. These maps occupied 18.0% of grey matter while extending across 91.0% of brain regions. After controlling for reporting topography, distributed cognitive, sensorimotor and organismic-affective maps reconstructed the residual consciousness landscape better than spatial surrogates. Organismic-affective maps contributed most, but functional contributions varied contextually across domains. Theory-associated regional loci added no additional meaningful prediction. Information carried by the functional families was both redundant and synergistic. Coactivation-network and hypergraph analyses revealed a shared network repertoire but context-dependent higher-order coalitions. These results argue against an invariant core, supporting a distributed neurobiology of consciousness in which specialised systems are weighted and combined differently across contexts.