La mente en la naturaleza. El problema de la finalidad de lo inconsciente
Luis Enrique Echarte Alonso
Anuario Filosófico November 19, 2008 DOI: 10.15581/009.41.2.383-414 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Hartmann's phenomenology exposes problems in Dennett's eliminativism and Teilhard's panpsychism regarding unconscious ends, but also contends that Hartmann's skepticism about objective knowledge of ends is flawed. Proposes that a degree of uncertainty remains, defending a position called 'Critical Finalism'. |
Abstract
In this paper I study the problem of unconscious ends, firstly, comparing three alternative physicalist views expressed in the systems of Nicolai Hartmann, Daniel Dennett and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Via this comparison, I show how the phenomenological perspective of the first author brings out the deficits of Dennett’s eliminativism and Teilhard’s panpsychism. Secondly, however, I criticize Hartmann’s thesis that ends are inaccessible events to objective knowledge, using certain arguments from Elizabeth Anscombe and Anthony Kenny. Nevertheless, I conclude that it is not possible to avoid a grade of uncertainty in the verifying of the existence of ends; this conclusion, in turns, leads me to defend a position that I call Critical Finalism .