BEYOND THE BRAIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND IN THE SEARCH FOR AN ONTOLOGY FOR CONSCIOUSNESS
Santiago Contreras
IBRO Neuroscience Reports October 1, 2023 DOI: 10.1016/j.ibneur.2023.08.2024 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that consciousness is irreducible to neural correlates and proposes a 'radical ontology' that decentralizes the brain while treating it as a causal part of consciousness. The authors defend a systemic emergentist ontology in which social and phylogenetic contingencies are fundamental, and infer that disturbances of consciousness arise from intersubjective difficulties with the world and oneself rather than from neural structures. |
Abstract
The cognitive neuroscientist intends to empirically demonstrate what he supposes of memory, emotions and executive functions, for this he has as object of study, "the brain" and elaborates explanatory models that belong to mechanicism as well as to physicalism within a realistic scientism. But what happens when a mental property such as consciousness is irreductible to neural correlates? Faced with this problem of demarcation, the neuroscience philosopher must advocate philosophical realism, avoid eliminativist theories, an exaggerated cognitive externalism, and finally reject all kinds of of dualism that proposes explanations of a phenomenal nature as substantial dualism did. This work outline intends to be a teaching proposal that the neuroscience philosopher serves the neuroscientist to have in common the search for a scientific ontology, an enterprise capable of unifying, but not reducing, that seeks the existence of legal relationships and pluralism. nomological in order to unravel the “furniture of human consciousness”. This thesis suggests the decentralization of the brain as a radical ontology of consciousness, although it considers it to be a causal part of it; however, the mind, conceived as the set of all mental events, is nowhere like human consciousness. Finally, the philosophical-scientific notions that are tried to be used here defend a systemic emergentist ontology, where they consider phylogenetic contingencies in the social sphere as a fundamental factor in the emergence of consciousness, therefore this leads us to infer that the disturbances of it do not find a seat in neural structures, but arise from the intersubjective difficulties that the conscious man has with the world and with himself. The ontology presented, unfinished by the way, has explanatory gaps that are a future challenge for the philosopher of mind. This thesis faces epistemological problems. Does the emergence of consciousness suppose a continuity or a discontinuity of its forms? Declaration of Interest Statement: None
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