Four Puzzles for Consciousness
Craig Delancey
Passionate Engines January 10, 2002 DOI: 10.1093/0195142713.003.0009 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that emotions' essential motivational character, their variability in character and intensity, and the inadequacy of representational explanations pose distinct puzzles for theories of phenomenal consciousness. |
Abstract
AbstractAfter a basic review of the contemporary debate about phenomenal consciousness, four puzzles about emotional experience are discussed. First, emotions appear to be essentially motivational states, making them poor candidates for arguments, akin to inverted spectra or zombie worlds. Second, emotions differ significantly in their character, whereas some phenomenal experiences do not. Third, emotions vary significantly in their intensity, another feature lacking in some phenomenal experiences. Fourth, representations do not appear to be the best explanation for the features of emotional experience.