Vindicating the Absent Qualia Objection
Earl Conee
Ratio April 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1111/rati.12171 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that although Robert van Gulick's criticism does not refute Michael Tye's argument against the incoherence of absent qualia, Tye's argument is unsuccessful, and that the evidence very strongly supports the possibility of absent qualia. |
Abstract
Abstract: Metaphysical functionalism holds that the nature of the mental is its functional role. Proponents of the absent qualia objection to functionalism assert that mental states with essential phenomenal qualities might have had functional duplicates without qualia. Michael Tye has argued that this purported possibility is incoherent. Robert van Gulick has criticized Tye's argument. It is contended here that although van Gulick's criticism does not refute the argument, Tye's argument is unsuccessful. It is also contended that our evidence very strongly supports the possibility of absent qualia.