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Reportability and illusions of phenomenality in the light of the global neuronal workspace model

Lionel Naccache, Stanislas Dehaene

Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x07002993 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Commentary Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that phenomenal consciousness cannot be experimentally disentangled from cognitive accessibility because subjective reports are necessary for evidence, and that the notion of a rich but non-reportable phenomenal world is largely illusory, pending clarification.

Abstract

AbstractCan we ever experimentally disentangle phenomenal consciousness from the cognitive accessibility inherent to conscious reports? In this commentary, we suggest that (1) Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness remains intractably entangled with the need to obtain subjective reports about it; and (2) many experimental paradigms suggest that the intuitive notion of a rich but non-reportable phenomenal world is, to a large extent illusory – in a sense that requires clarification.

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