Otto in the Chinese Room
Spontaneous Generations A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science August 30, 2010 DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v4i1.11718 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the extended mind thesis, as proposed by Clark and Chalmers, can support the systems reply to Searle's Chinese Room argument, thereby strengthening the case for machine thought and addressing a major objection to the Turing test. |
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explore a possible resolution to one of the main objections to machine thought as propounded by Alan Turing in the imitation game that bears his name. That machines will, at some point, be able to think is the central idea of this text, a claim supported by a schema posited by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in their paper, “The Extended Mind” (1998). Their notion of active externalism is used to support, strengthen and further what John Searle calls “the systems reply” to his objection to machine thought or strong Artificial Intelligence in his Chinese Room thought experiment. Relevant objections and replies to these objections are considered, then some conclusions about machine thought and the Turing test are examined.