Spinoza And The Theory Of Identity (2P1–13)
2011 DOI: 10.1163/ej.9789004194250.i-380.29 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Spinoza's identity theory of mind and body, based on substance monism, shares underlying resemblances with contemporary approaches to the mind-body problem, despite radical differences in metaphysical presuppositions. |
Abstract
The recent history of the mind-body problem appears as the history of a philosophical encounter with Descartes. Spinoza seems to play only a subordinate role. Spinoza's key metaphysical presuppositions and background assumptions all diverge radically from those of contemporary theorists. Given these deep-seated differences, any reference to Spinoza in the mind-body debate seems highly problematic. In direct agreement with the substance monism defended in the first part of the Ethics , Spinoza asserts the identity of mind and body. A more detailed reading of Spinoza's work makes it clear that there is an underlying resemblance to contemporary approaches. This chapter briefly sketches the relevant statements present in Ethics . It considers the central claims of theory of mind as it is developed at the beginning of the second part of the Ethics . Finally, it discusses the systematic and reception-historical relations between Spinoza's approach and contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind. Keywords: Descartes; Ethics ; mind-body problem; Spinoza; substance monism; theory of identity; theory of mind