Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza
Michael Della Rocca
November 21, 1996 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195095623.001.0001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Spinoza's views on thought and the mind-body relation are systematically linked to his denial of mental-physical causal interaction, providing a unified perspective on his philosophy. |
Abstract
Abstract This first extensive study of Spinoza’s philosophy of mind concentrates on two problems crucial to the philosopher’s thoughts on the matter: the requirements for having a thought about a particular object, and the problem of the mind’s relation to the body. Della Rocca contends that Spinoza’s positions are systematically connected with each other and with a principle at the heart of his metaphysical system: his denial of causal or explanatory relations between the mental and the physical. In this way, Della Rocca’s exploration of these two problems provides a new and illuminating perspective on Spinoza’s philosophy as a system.
Citations in the library
Cited by 3
- The Idea of the Idea, Consciousness, and Human Experience in Spinoza’s Ethics January 13, 2026
- From structure to experience: a Spinozist framework for consciousness rooted in critical brain dynamics. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2026
- Theories About Consciousness in Spinoza'sEthics The Philosophical Review October 1, 2010