Perception
Oxford University Press eBooks May 14, 2009 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381344.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a detailed naive realist theory, refined in light of criticisms and empirical findings on change blindness, can account for phenomenal character and offers hope for a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness that answers the 'hard problem of consciousness'. |
Abstract
This chapter develops a naive realist theory of veridical perception. It begins from the thought that the phenomenal character of our visual experiences is simply a matter of the scene before us but finds this to be open to criticism. In light of these criticisms, together with the empirical findings of change/inattentional blindness experiments and considerations concerning the conceptual sophistication of perceivers, a detailed naive realist theory of perception is then presented. The chapter concludes with the suggestion that such a theory of phenomenal character offers hope for a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness that can answer the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ and bridge the explanatory gap.