Digital Doppelgängers and Lifespan Extension: What Matters? / trans. from Engl. A. V. Antipov

Abstract

There is an ongoing debate about the ethics of research on lifespan extension: roughly, using medical technologies to extend biological human lives beyond the current ‘natural’ limit of about 120 years. At the same time, there is an exploding interest in the use of artificial intelligence to create ‘digital twins’ of persons, for example by fine-tuning large language models on data specific to particular individuals.In this paper, we consider whether digital twins (or digital doppelgängers, as we refer to them) could be a path toward a kind of life extension — or more precisely, a kind of person extension — that does not rely on biological continuity. We discuss relevant accounts of consciousness and personal identity and argue that digital doppelgängers may at least help us achieve some of the aims or ostensible goods of personspan extension, even if they may not count as literal extensions of our personhood on dominant philosophical accounts. We also consider relational accounts of personhood and discuss how digital doppelgängers may be able to extend personhood in a relational sense, or at least secure some of the goods associated with relevant relationships.We conclude by suggesting that a research program to investigate such issues is relevant to ongoing debates about the ethics of extending the human lifespan.