A No-Go Theorem for Process Theories of Consciousness

doi:10.31234/osf.io/w3n6v_v1

JavaScript is disabled in your browser. You can still read and search, but features like search previews, menus, and forms may not work until it's enabled.

A No-Go Theorem for Process Theories of Consciousness

PsyArXiv August 10, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/w3n6v_v1 (opens in new tab)

Relevant Not relevant

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract

Characteristics	Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points	Argues that process theories of consciousness are logically inconsistent, as they cannot account for the unity of experience without leading to an infinite regress or losing the subjective character of consciousness.

Abstract

A No-Go Theorem for Process Theories of Consciousness

No-Go Theorems on Machine Consciousness Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness October 31, 2023
The case for neurons: a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip. Neuroscience of Consciousness December 26, 2024
The 'No-Supervenience' Theorem and its Implications for Theories of Consciousness Journal of Consciousness Studies February 1, 2024
A Formalizable Proof of the No-Supervenience Theorem: A Diagonal Limitation on the Viability of Physicalist Theories of Consciousness arXiv (Cornell University) June 8, 2023
Non-Computability of Consciousness arXiv.org May 11, 2007

Study at a glance

Abstract

Related reading