The 'No-Supervenience' Theorem and its Implications for Theories of Consciousness
Journal of Consciousness Studies February 1, 2024 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.31.1.138 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the no-supervenience theorem rules out reflexive monism, realistic monism, and illusionism in their current forms, and that Chalmers' property dualism requires humans to behave irrationally. |
Abstract
The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by the no-supervenience theorem, except for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally.