The Phenomenology of Worldlessness
Worldlessness After Heidegger February 1, 2020 DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474457613.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that Derrida's deconstruction is fundamentally concerned with worldlessness, yet his final seminars show he ultimately prioritizes the world over worldlessness as the foundation for deconstructive ethics. |
Abstract
The chapter follows Jacques Derrida’s development from one end of his career to its conclusion and argues that the whole project of deconstruction must be understood in relation to the concept of worldlessness. The first part of the chapter is concerned with Derrida’s critique of Edmund Husserl. Derrida argues that the phenomenological concept of worldlessness is based on the auto-affective structure of the transcendental ego and, therefore, it remains captive of a metaphysics of presence. The second part of the chapter focuses on Derrida’s readings of Heidegger and tries to show that, for Derrida, Dasein’s supposed worldliness is dependent on an ontology of worldlessness. The closing section of the chapter provides a reading of Derrida’s final seminars and tries to show that, in the end, in spite of the discovery of the centrality of worldlessness, Derrida nevertheless chooses the world over worldlessness as the foundation of any deconstructive ethics.