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The Downward Causality and the Hard Problem of Consciousness or Why Computer Programs Do not Work in the Dark

Alexander Boldachev

Studia Humana January 31, 2015 DOI: 10.1515/sh-2015-0002 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that downward causality from higher levels is necessary for any low-level process, so the "hard problem of consciousness" dissolves into a general problem of interlevel causation. Proposes that biological determination of chemistry and conscious causation of neurons are the same problem with one solution.

Abstract

Abstract Any low-level processes, the sequence of chemical interactions in a living cell, muscle cellular activity, processor commands or neuron interaction, is possible only if there is a downward causality, only due to uniting and controlling power of the highest level. Therefore, there is no special “hard problem of consciousness”, i.e. the problem of relation of ostensibly purely biological materiality and non-causal mentality - we have only the single philosophical problem of relation between the upward and downward causalities, the problem of interrelation between hierarchic levels of existence. It is necessary to conclude that the problem of determinacy of chemical processes by the biological ones and the problem of neuron interactions caused by consciousness are of one nature and must have one solution.

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