Consciousness Theory of Neuroscience (CTN):Hard Problem of Consciousness: Dissolved

Abstract

The “Hard Problem of Consciousness” may not be a problem of consciousness at all. This work argues that the famous explanatory gap identified by David Chalmers is better understood as a limitation in the way neuroscience and contemporary consciousness theories attempt to explain first-person phenomenal experience through third-person physical and neural descriptions. The Consciousness Theory of Neuroscience (CTN) reframes the Hard Problem as a problem of scientific explanation rather than proof that consciousness is inherently inexplicable. Computational, information-theoretic, global-workspace, integrated-information, predictive-processing, and other frameworks face the same structural challenge when they attempt to derive first-person experience from third-person descriptions. CTN proposes a methodological reversal: consciousness should not be treated only as an output to be explained, but also as a source of evidence for evaluating and constraining scientific models of the brain. The central claim is simple: The Hard Problem is not necessarily a mystery of consciousness. It may be a limitation of the framework used to explain it. This work invites the consciousness-science community to reconsider where the “Hard Problem” actually resides—and whether it should be dissolved rather than treated as an ontological mystery.