Mental representations are not necessary for fish consciousness
Luis H. Favela
Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1243 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Evolution Cognitive neuroscience Zoology Cognition and perception Life sciences |
| Key points | Argues that the representational theory of consciousness, which Woodruff assumes, undermines his case for teleost phenomenal consciousness. Proposes that organisms can have phenomenological experiences without indirect perception via mental representations, based on ecological psychology and comparative ethology. |
Abstract
Woodruff (2017) argues that teleost fishes are capable of phenomenal consciousness. Central to his argument is the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is representational in nature. I think the commitment to a representational theory of consciousness undermines Woodruff’s case for teleost phenomenal consciousness. The reason is that organisms do not need to perceive the world indirectly via mental images/representations in order to have phenomenological experiences. My argument is based on considerations of ecological psychology and comparative ethology.
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