Consciousness, evidence, and moral standing
Irina Mikhalevich
Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1208 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Evolution Cognitive neuroscience Zoology Cognition and perception Life sciences |
| Key points | Argues that the objection that Woodruff's evidence only establishes access consciousness does not decisively undermine his argument for fish sentience, and that his argument remains useful for ethics and fish welfare policy. |
Abstract
Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-consciousness”) in fishes, and argues that these neurological data, along with behavioral evidence, suggest that teleost fishes are in all probability sentient organisms. Woodruff’s case may be strengthened by challenging key assumptions behind a common criticism of accounts such as his: that fishes cannot be p-conscious because they lack the cortical structures necessary for p-consciousness. A more serious objection to Woodruff’s proposal would be that his evidence for p-consciousness establishes only that fishes are “access-conscious” (“a-conscious”), where a-conscious states are cognitive representations that are made available to cognitive processing. This criticism calls into question his inference from certain cognitive states to the presence of p-consciousness, and may have significant implications for the moral standing of fishes and their treatment in fish welfare policy, since p-consciousness, but not a-consciousness alone, is typically thought to ground moral standing. I conclude that this criticism does not raise a decisive objection to Woodruff’s argument, or to its usefulness for ethics and policy.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 5
- Brain damage and the moral significance of consciousness. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine February 1, 2009
- Consciousness in teleosts: There is something it feels like to be a fish 2017
- What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences April 18, 2016
- Insects have the capacity for subjective experience 2016
- Animal consciousness: a synthetic approach. Trends in Neurosciences September 1, 2009