Perception and Disjunctivism

Disjunctivism in philosophy of perception asks whether perceptions and hallucinations differ fundamentally in kind. The article argues that if a perception could have been a hallucination with the same content, the difference between them would depend on the external world, not the mind. Perceptions have a double existence—both intentional and natural—and allow indefinite perspectival transformations due to their informational link to objects. On this basis, a disjunctivist position is ascribed to Kant. The authors also contend that perceptions, unlike hallucinations, carry their own epistemic warrants, applicable to both humans and non-rational animals.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Disjunctivism is a much debated topic within present-day philosophy of perception. The pressing issue here is whether there is a fundamental difference in kind between perceptions and hallucinations. If a perception could counterfactually have been a hallucination with the same content, one can hardly claim that perceptions and hallucinations are fundamentally different in kind qua representational states. What determines whether a representation is a perception or a hallucination is then not what the mind is like but rather what the external world is like. However, singular marks in perception have double existence – both “intentional” existence in the perceptions themselves and “natural” existence in the perceived scene. Perceptions also come with possible perspectival transformations ad indefinitum, due to their informational link to their objects. On this basis, a disjunctivist position is ascribed to Kant. It is also argued that perceptions, unlike hallucinations, come with their own epistemic warrants, be it in humans or in non-rational animals.