The Uniformity in Seeing
September 29, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780197913413.003.0006 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Nyāya philosophy of perception is not disjunctivist, contrary to some contemporary scholars. For Nyāya, perceptual experience is uniform: illusion is erroneous because an absent feature is presented as present, yet the experience remains relational since the perceiver is presentationally acquainted with that feature. |
Abstract
Abstract Disjunctivism is the view that we must give different explanations for genuine perceptual experience and for perceptual illusions and hallucinations. Some contemporary scholars have argued that Nyāya philosophy of perception is disjunctivist. This chapter disagrees with this claim, and demonstrates that, for Nyāya, seeing is uniform. The entire point of the Nyāya discussion of illusion is that an absent feature is mistakenly presented as-present. The perceptual experience is, therefore, erroneous, precisely because something which is actually absent is presented-as-actually-present. But, insofar as this feature is one with which the perceiver is presentationally acquainted, the experience remains firmly within the orbit of relationalism. Nyāya relationalism supplies a uniform analysis of the nature of perceptual experiences.