Feasibility of the Mechanistic Explanation in the Case of Near-Death Experiences: Nothing but a Reductionism?

The new mechanistic philosophy (NMP) explains phenomena by identifying mechanisms as organized complex systems, not as a form of metaphysical reductionism. The author argues that near-death experiences (NDEs), categorized as religious experiences, can be approached within this framework. While scholars like Egil Asprem and Ann Taves contend that mechanistic explanation can illuminate the explanation of religion, the author emphasizes its limits in this context and highlights epistemic-methodological advantages over alternative models proposed by Michael Marsh, Frederick Barrett, and Roland Griffiths.

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Abstract

The new mechanistic philosophy (NMP) seeks to identify and explain the mechanisms of various phenomena, including their overall organization and the interactions between the individualized components. I argue that mechanistic explanation focuses on mechanisms conceived of as organized complex systems and should not be considered as merely a form of metaphysical reductionism. I discuss that among the phenomena that can be approached within the new mechanistic framework are near-death experiences (NDEs), which can be included within the vast range of experiences that are grouped under the category of religious experience. Since studying such experiences is far from methodologically simple, I show the feasibility of applying the mechanistic explanation to NDEs. While some scholars, such as Egil Asprem and Ann Taves, argue that mechanistic explanation can shed new light on the explanation of religion, I emphasize the limits of such an explanation in this context as well as the epistemic-methodological advantages in comparison with alternative explanatory models, especially the models proposed by Michael Marsh, Frederick Barrett and Roland Griffiths.