Near-Death Experiences: A Critique of the Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin Physicalist Interpretation

A critique of Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin's physicalist explanation of near-death experiences (NDEs) identifies two major weaknesses: heavy reliance on ad hoc hypotheses and frequent appeal to promissory materialism. The authors argue that labeling NDEs as hallucinations is problematic because NDE perceptions differ phenomenologically from hallucinations, are often veridical regarding the physical realm, and pathologizing them risks harmful psychological outcomes. They propose a common proximate cause for all NDEs, suggesting the nonphysical mind-entity theory—where the nonmaterial mind separates from the body—has good explanatory power. They contend that scientific inquiry will eventually expand physicalist theory into an extended, transmaterial naturalism.

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Abstract

In "Near Death Experiences: Understanding Visions of the Afterlife," authors John Martin Fischer and Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin (2016) argued for purely physicalist explanations of near-death experiences (NDEs) and against "supernatural" explanations involving objects and events--out-of-body experiences, heavenly realms, meeting deceased relatives--that have no physical reality. In our critique, we identify two major weaknesses to their argument: heavy reliance on ad hoc hypotheses and frequent appeal to "promissory materialism." Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin applied the term "hallucination" to NDEs because, by definition, they "do not correspond to reality." We found use of this term problematic for several reasons: that NDE perceptions are phenomenologically different from hallucinations, that NDE perceptions of the physical realm are nearly always veridical, and that labelling NDEs "hallucinations" pathologizes a normal, subjective experience, with potentially harmful psychological outcomes. Although Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin argued a theory of NDEs that invokes only one explanatory factor, we argue for a likely common proximate cause for all NDEs and that the nonphysical "mind-entity theory" in which the nonmaterial mind separates from the physical body in an NDE, is a likely candidate theory with good explanatory power. We believe that ultimately the theory explaining NDEs will be corrected through the normal process of scientific inquiry, resulting in an expansion of current physicalist theory to include what is now considered supernatural, thus becoming an extended, transmaterial naturalist theory.