Intentionality, understood as the capacity of systems to be “about” something, remains a central issue in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Classical approaches face significant limitations, especially when applied to artificial systems. Representationalism struggles with the symbol grounding problem, functionalism reduces intentionality to causal roles, and enactivism restricts it...
To model informatic intelligence, agency, consciousness and the like, one must address a claimed Hard Problem: that a grasp of ‘the mind’ lies wholly beyond scientific views. While this claim is suspect, persistent analogues can be identified in the literature, such as a “symbol grounding problem”, “solving intelligence”, a missing “theory of meaning”, and more. The topic of subjective...
The field of consciousness displays a striking lack of consensus on many important issues, one of which is the possibility of consciousness in machines and software. However, consciousness in machines has dramatic ethical implications, regardless of which ethical framework is used. This suggests that the best course of action would be to try not to create conscious machines until we better...