Dispositions, Mereology and Panpsychism
Simone Gozzano
July 10, 2023 DOI: 10.4324/9781003298830-16 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that panpsychism's assumption that phenomenal properties are categorical ultimates is questionable, and that protopanpsychism, which treats phenomenal properties as manifesting under mereologically analyzable circumstances, is the only view combining mereology and dispositionalism. The author raises doubts about whether protophenomenal properties can truly be categorical. |
Abstract
Panpsychism, the view that the ultimate elements of reality are phenomenal properties, lies at the crossroad of the metaphysics of powers and mereology. The way this chapter considers this crossroad is by taking pain, a phenomenal property, to be a mereologically complex power. Panpsychism assumes that phenomenal properties are categorical ultimates. But are phenomenal properties suitable to fill this role? Are they apt for grounding physical properties, or should this role be played by some more fundamental property? To tackle this question, this chapter considers protopanpsychism which seems the only view that can combine mereology and dispositionalism inasmuch as it posits that phenomenal properties manifest themselves in circumstances that could be analyzed along mereological principles. This chapter details doubts that protophenomenal properties can really be categorical properties.