Can AI Think Like Us? Kriegel’s Hybrid Model

A systematic critique of two competing paradigms in the philosophy of mind—Naturalist–Externalist Research Program (NERP) and Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program (PIRP)—focuses on Uriah Kriegel’s attempt to reconcile them. Naturalist accounts derive mental content from brain activity and environmental interaction, while phenomenological theories hold that mental states present an internal semblance to the subject. Kriegel tries to naturalize mental content within a Same Order theory, but this limits his ability to ground intentionality in consciousness as PIRP requires. The idea that mind arises from manipulating representations is challenged by dynamical approaches to cognitive science, though advanced representational models persist by simulating phenomenological qualities through internal data organization. The approach is comparative and reconstructive, examining structural tensions between the paradigms.

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Abstract

This review provides a systematic critique of the debate between two paradigms in the philosophy of mind—the Naturalist–Externalist Research Program (NERP) and the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program (PIRP)—with particular focus on Uriah Kriegel’s reconciliation project. Following Kriegel’s view, attention is given to rational agents’ awareness of their mental states—a key issue since most current artificial intelligence systems aim to model rational thinking and action. Naturalist accounts derive mental content from brain activity and environmental interaction, emphasizing a constitutive dependence of the former on the latter. In contrast, phenomenological theories assert that the object of mental states is an internal semblance presented to the subject. Within this framework, I maintain that Kriegel attempts to naturalize mental content within the framework of a Same Order theory, but this limits his ability to demonstrate that intentionality is grounded in consciousness in the sense of the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. Compounding this issue, the idea that the mind arises from manipulating representations has been challenged by dynamical approaches to cognitive science, yet advanced representational models persist, often simulating phenomenological qualities through forms of internal data organization. Methodologically, the approach is primarily comparative and reconstructive, focusing on the structural tensions and theoretical commitments that distinguish NERP and PIRP.