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L’agenda ontologica della neuroscienza cognitiva: le neuroscienze come “arbitro” delle categorie psicologiche (e viceversa)

Marco Viola

Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia August 6, 2016 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2016.0017 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Philosophy of neiroscience Cognitive ontology
Key points Argues that the empirical success of heuristics prescribing mutual constraints between psychology and cognitive neuroscience provides the strongest defense for a one-to-one mapping of cognitive functions to neural structures.

Abstract

This article aims at providing a rational reconstruction of the ontology of Cognitive Neuroscience. That should satisfy three desiderata: (a) an ontology of cognitive functions describing any operation of the mind; (b) an ontology of neural structure describing any part of the brain; (c) a one-to-one correspondence between each cognitive function and a given neural structure. The assumptions sustaining these desiderata will be examined, as well as some skeptical arguments against them. Then, after having surveyed some possible counterarguments to the skeptical objections, it will be argued that the strongest defense of this research agenda is the empirical success of the heuristics that it prescribes. Thus, such heuristics will be described, showing how the mutual constraints of psychology and cognitive neuroscience provides some criteria for choosing (and integrating) cognitive functions and neural structures.

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