Beyond determinism and materialism, or isn't it time we took consciousness seriously?
Journal of behavior therapy and experimental psychiatry September 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1016/0005-7916(95)00026-v (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the conflict between behaviorist and cognitive psychology is philosophical, not scientific, and that behaviorism's premises are false while consciousness and volition must be axiomatic in psychology. |
Abstract
This essay argues: (1) that the fundamental conflict between the behaviorist and cognitive approaches to psychology are philosophical, not scientific; (2) that the philosophical premises underlying behaviorism (materialism, epiphenomenalism, functional model of causality, and the rejection of concepts referring to conscious states and processes) are false; and (3) that an objective, scientific approach to psychology must take consciousness and volition as axiomatic starting points.