Physicalism, realization, and structure.
Studies in history and philosophy of science April 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.11.006 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractPhysicalism about the mind—the view that mental states are nothing over and above physical states—has been a central topic in philosophy of mind since the 1960s. This paper aims to clarify key concepts in that debate: physicalism, identity, functionalism, realization, and constitution. After reviewing historical background, it focuses on two issues: the difference between a functional property (defined by its causal role) and a structural property (defined by its physical composition), and whether a realization account of the mental-physical relation offers a better physicalist theory than a constitutional account.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Constitution Functional property Functionalism Identity Physicalism |
| Key finding | Argues that clarifying the distinction between functional and structural properties and comparing realization and constitutional accounts helps advance the philosophical formulation of mind-body physicalism. |
Abstract
In the philosophy of mind and psychology, a central question since the 1960s has been that of how to give a philosophically adequate formulation of mind-body physicalism. A large quantity of work on the topic has been done in the interim. There have been, and continue to be, extensive discussions of the ideas of physicalism, identity, functionalism, realization, and constitution. My aim in this paper is a modest one: it is to get clearer about these ideas and some of their interrelations. After providing some background and history, I shall focus on two related topics: the distinction between a functional property and a structural one and the dispute over whether a realization account of the mental-physical relation provides a better physicalist account than a constitutional account.