Whether simple organisms like nematodes might possess minimal phenomenal consciousness is explored by reviewing current theories of consciousness in light of evidence from Caenorhabditis elegans, a worm with a nervous system of 302 neurons. The authors critically assess models such as global workspace theory, integrated information theory, and unlimited associative learning, and propose empirical approaches using C. elegans to test predictions about consciousness. The review does not reach a definitive conclusion but suggests that C. elegans may be a useful model for investigating the physical mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness.
The embodiment approach to cognition, which grounds mental processes in bodily experience, faces resistance due to evidence against its strong forms. This approach breaks from Cartesian dualism by treating cognition as rooted in modal experience, aligns with emergent materialism, and is supported by experimental research. However, embodiment must still address abstractions, theoretical debates about representations, and neuroscientific findings questioning the role of sensorimotor properties in cognition. While strong embodiment is challenged by conceptual and physiological setbacks, weak embodiment is supported by compelling evidence. Future research should focus on the psychophysiological bases of grounded cognition and redirect efforts toward cross-modal correspondence.