Mind and soul? Two notions in the light of contemporary philosophy.
History of Psychiatry September 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1177/0957154x211010041 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe author examines the history of the concepts of mind and soul through the lens of the Aristotelian notion of 'Form', contrasting it with the ontologized versions assumed by conventional science. He argues that contemporary neuroscience does not have the necessary conceptual tools to address the meaning of mind and soul, nor their agential implications such as free will and moral decision-making.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Enrico berti Italy Libet Putnam Free will |
| Key finding | Argues that current neuroscience lacks the conceptual wherewithal to deal with the meaning of mind and soul and with agential consequences such as free will and moral decision making. |
Abstract
From the perspective of the Aristotelian notion of 'Form', the author explores the history of the concepts of mind and soul focusing on their ontologized version, as entertained by conventional science. He concludes that current neuroscience lacks the conceptual wherewithal required to deal with the meaning of mind and soul and with agential consequences such as free will and moral decision making. [GEB].