Neuroscience and the soul: competing explanations for the human experience.

Belief in the soul decreases when neuroscience offers strong mechanistic explanations for the mind, but increases when gaps in neuroscience research are emphasized. Two experiments showed that physical and metaphysical explanations may serve as alternative theories for the mind, with people shifting between them depending on the perceived completeness of neuroscience. This suggests that belief in the soul is not fixed but can be influenced by how neuroscientific explanations are presented.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The development of fMRI techniques has generated a boom of neuroscience research across the psychological sciences, and revealed neural correlates for many psychological phenomena seen as central to the human experience (e.g., morality, agency). Meanwhile, the rise of neuroscience has reignited old debates over mind-body dualism and the soul. While some scientists use neuroscience to bolster a material account of consciousness, others point to unexplained neural phenomena to defend dualism and a spiritual perspective on the mind. In two experiments we examine how exposure to neuroscience research impacts belief in the soul. We find that belief in soul decreases when neuroscience provides strong mechanistic explanations for mind. But when explanatory gaps in neuroscience research are emphasized, belief in soul is enhanced, suggesting that physical and metaphysical explanations may be used reflexively as alternative theories for mind. Implications for the future of belief in soul and neuroscience research are discussed.