Further Facts and Simulation
Human Ontology July 1, 2026 DOI: 10.17983/301642 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe notion of 'further facts'—facts that are not fixed by the physical structure of the universe—underpins many debates in metaphysics, such as whether mental facts depend on physical ones. Despite its importance, the concept has received little systematic analysis. This paper examines Vincent Conitzer's 2018 work, which uses computer simulation to investigate further facts and shifts the focus from their existence to the validity of reasoning about them. The paper outlines Conitzer's argument, considers physicalist responses regarding mental facts, and extends the analysis to other domains, showing how simulation as a philosophical model reshapes debates beyond philosophy of mind.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Physicalism Argument complex analysis Metaphysics Section typography Free will |
| Key finding | Argues that Conitzer's use of computer simulation shifts attention from the existence of further facts to the validity of the reasoning by which they are inferred, and that this approach can reshape metaphysical debates. |
Abstract
This paper examines the notion of further facts and its significance for contemporary metaphysics. Many central metaphysical questions can be understood as disputes over whether certain facts are contingent relative to the physical structure of the universe. A paradigmatic example is the debate over whether mental facts are contingent upon physical facts. Similar issues arise in discussions of time, personal identity, and related topics. Despite its importance, the notion of further facts itself has received relatively little systematic attention. This paper focuses on one notable contribution to this topic: Vincent Conitzer's "A Puzzle about Further Facts" (2018). Conitzer's work is noteworthy in two respects: first, for introducing computer simulation as a framework for investigating further facts; and second, for shifting attention from the existence of further facts to the validity of the reasoning by which such facts are inferred. This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we outline Conitzer's argument and clarify his central claims. In Section 2, we restrict attention to mental facts and examine possible physicalist responses to his argument. In Section 3, we extend the analysis to other kinds of further facts and consider how simulation, understood as a philosophical model, reshapes debates beyond the philosophy of mind.