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A Puzzle about Further Facts

Vincent Conitzer

arXiv Preprint Archive February 4, 2018 preprint

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Keywords Physics.hist-ph
Key points Argues that a sequence of simulation thought experiments raises the question of when a protagonist can no longer soundly conclude that further facts about qualia, personal identity, or time exist.

Abstract

In metaphysics, there are a number of distinct but related questions about the existence of "further facts" -- facts that are contingent relative to the physical structure of the universe. These include further facts about qualia, personal identity, and time. In this article I provide a sequence of examples involving computer simulations, ranging from one in which the protagonist can clearly conclude such further facts exist to one that describes our own condition. This raises the question of where along the sequence (if at all) the protagonist stops being able to soundly conclude that further facts exist.