Simulated Minds, Artificial Consciousness, and the Theory-Relative Simulation Hypothesis

Abstract

The simulation hypothesis says that our world might be a computer-generated environment populated by simulated minds. Since Bostrom's [2003] "simulation argument," it has attracted attention in philosophy of mind and, increasingly, in the mind sciences. The simulation hypothesis says that our world might be a computer-generated environment populated by simulated minds, raising questions about artificial consciousness and advanced AI systems. I make three claims. First, standard formulations of the simulation hypothesis quietly assume strong substrate-independent computationalism and something like Chalmers' organizational invariance, and so are not neutral about the metaphysics of mind. Second, plugging four leading theories-predictive processing, Integrated Information Theory, global workspace theory, and recurrent processing theory-into the picture yields a theory-relative simulation hypothesis (TR-SH): there are PP-relative, IIT-relative, GWT-relative, and RPT-relative simulation hypotheses, and they differ sharply in their substrate demands, architectural requirements, and risks of "zombie simulations." Third, current attempts to turn the simulation hypothesis into a standard scientific hypothesis-for example, via astrophysical signatures or Bayesian modelling-only touch narrow implementation choices rather than the hypothesis in full generality. I suggest that the simulation hypothesis is best understood as metaphysics guided and constrained by consciousness science, and that its principal value is to stress-test theories of consciousness and to highlight the ethical and AI-safety stakes of large-scale simulations.