Embodied cognition and circular causality: on the role of constitutive autonomy in the reciprocal coupling of perception and action

The reciprocal coupling of perception and action is well known: perceptions guide action and actions influence perception. Most research focuses on external behavior, but this article argues that the relationship also involves a constitutive, internal bodily element. The authors contend that cognition, perception, and action are all processes primarily aimed at maintaining an agent's biological autonomy. These processes are inherently circular—self-organizing, self-producing, and self-maintaining. The reciprocal coupling is founded on endogenous roles in constitutive autonomy and circular causality of self-regulation, not merely on sensory-motor contingencies from external behavior. The coupling occurs through the internal milieu of the agent's organismic embodiment. Homeostasis and allostasis contribute to this circular self-regulation.

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Abstract

The reciprocal coupling of perception and action in cognitive agents has been firmly established: perceptions guide action but so too do actions influence what is perceived. While much has been said on the implications of this for the agent's external behavior, less attention has been paid to what it means for the internal bodily mechanisms which underpin cognitive behavior. In this article, we wish to redress this by reasserting that the relationship between cognition, perception, and action involves a constitutive element as well as a behavioral element, emphasizing that the reciprocal link between perception and action in cognition merits a renewed focus on the system dynamics inherent in constitutive biological autonomy. Our argument centers on the idea that cognition, perception, and action are all dependent on processes focussed primarily on the maintenance of the agent's autonomy. These processes have an inherently circular nature-self-organizing, self-producing, and self-maintaining-and our goal is to explore these processes and suggest how they can explain the reciprocity of perception and action. Specifically, we argue that the reciprocal coupling is founded primarily on their endogenous roles in the constitutive autonomy of the agent and an associated circular causality of global and local processes of self-regulation, rather than being a mutual sensory-motor contingency that derives from exogenous behavior. Furthermore, the coupling occurs first and foremost via the internal milieu realized by the agent's organismic embodiment. Finally, we consider how homeostasis and the related concept of allostasis contribute to this circular self-regulation.