Modelling Consciousness within Mental Monism: An Automata-Theoretic Approach.
Peter Lloyd
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) June 22, 2020 DOI: 10.3390/e22060698 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Consciousness Mental models Idealism Automata theory |
| Key points | Argues that mental monism constrains possible models of consciousness and proposes a minimal set of hypotheses that such models should respect. From these hypotheses, many formal models permitting universal computation in the mental world through cellular automata can be constructed. The author proposes a transition rule with the unusual property of deep copying in the time dimension. |
Abstract
Models of consciousness are usually developed within physical monist or dualistic frameworks, in which the structure and dynamics of the mind are derived from the workings of the physical brain. Little attention has been given to modelling consciousness within a mental monist framework, deriving the structure and dynamics of the mental world from primitive mental constituents only-with no neural substrate. Mental monism is gaining attention as a candidate solution to Chalmers' Hard Problem on philosophical grounds, and it is therefore timely to examine possible formal models of consciousness within it. Here, I argue that the austere ontology of mental monism places certain constraints on possible models of consciousness, and propose a minimal set of hypotheses that a model of consciousness (within mental monism) should respect. From those hypotheses, it would be possible to construct many formal models that permit universal computation in the mental world, through cellular automata. We need further hypotheses to define transition rules for particular models, and I propose a transition rule with the unusual property of deep copying in the time dimension.
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Citations in the library
Cited by 3
- Analysis of Shannon's entropy to contrast between the Embodied and Neurocentrist hypothesis of conscious experience. Biosystems December 1, 2024
- Embodying Consciousness in Brains and Machines II: Portals Open Journal of Philosophy 2026
- Perspectivas del estudio de la consciencia: aproximación desde las ciencias de la complejidad y la biología evolutiva Entreciencias diálogos en la Sociedad del Conocimiento March 4, 2024
Cites 5
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- An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem April 20, 2017
- Objects of consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology June 17, 2014