Embodying Consciousness in Brains and Machines II: Portals
Open Journal of Philosophy January 1, 2026 DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2026.163024 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis paper adopts the philosophical theory of mental monism and examines the constraints it places on models of embodiment. It proposes a biologically plausible model of embodiment in brains and extends it to machines. The conscious mind is characterized as a nonphysical, nonlocal system composed only of volitions and phenomenal experiences, subject to natural laws and capable of processing information independently of the brain. The authors argue that this framework allows for a coherent account of how mind and body interact, and they explore implications for artificial embodiment.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Monism Subject documents Natural archaeology Extension predicate logic |
| Key finding | Proposes that a mental monist framework can support biologically plausible models of embodiment in brains and machines, characterizing the conscious mind as a nonphysical, nonlocal system of volitions and experiences. |
Abstract
This paper adopts the philosophical theory of mental monism and examines the constraints on models of embodiment within that framework. It proposes a biologically plausible model of embodiment in brains and suggests an extension to embodiment in machines. The conscious mind is characterized as a nonphysical and nonlocal system comprised only of volitions and phenomenal experiences, subject to scientifically discoverable natural laws, and capable of processing information independently of the linked brain tissue.