Embodying Consciousness in Brains and Machines II: Portals
Peter Lloyd
Open Journal of Philosophy 2026 DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2026.163024 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Monism Subject documents Natural archaeology Extension predicate logic Qualia Information processing Cognitive science Epistemology Mental model Physicalism Mental activity |
| Key points | Proposes that a mental monist framework can support biologically plausible models of embodiment in brains and machines, characterizing the conscious mind as a nonphysical, nonlocal system of volitions and experiences. |
Abstract
This paper adopts the philosophical theory of mental monism and examines the constraints on models of embodiment within that framework. It proposes a biologically plausible model of embodiment in brains and suggests an extension to embodiment in machines. The conscious mind is characterized as a nonphysical and nonlocal system comprised only of volitions and phenomenal experiences, subject to scientifically discoverable natural laws, and capable of processing information independently of the linked brain tissue.
Citations in the library
Cites 9
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Consciousness in the universe: a review of the 'Orch OR' theory. March 1, 2014
- Split brain: divided perception but undivided consciousness Brain January 5, 2017
- Split-Brain: What We Know Now and Why This is Important for Understanding Consciousness Neuropsychology Review May 12, 2020
- Is Mind Quantum? 2021
and 4 more in the library