Modelling Consciousness within Mental Monism: An Automata-Theoretic Approach.
Entropy (Basel) June 22, 2020 DOI: 10.3390/e22060698 (opens in new tab) via PubMed Central
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis theoretical paper proposes a model of consciousness grounded in mental monism—the view that reality is fundamentally mental—using automata theory, a branch of computer science concerned with abstract machines and computation. The authors argue that conscious experience can be understood as the behavior of self-referential automata operating within a purely mental substrate. By formalizing consciousness in terms of state transitions and information processing, the approach aims to bridge subjective experience with formal, mathematical description. The work does not present empirical data but offers a conceptual framework intended to advance philosophical debates about the nature of consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Proposes that automata theory can formally model conscious states within a mental monist framework, treating consciousness as computational patterns in a universal mental substrate. |
Abstract
Modelling Consciousness within Mental Monism: An Automata-Theoretic Approach.